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Resolving Relocation Issues Pursuant to the  
ALI Family Dissolution Principles:  
Are Children Better Protected?∗ 
Janet Leach Richards∗∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In our increasingly mobile society,1 a number of factors may 
prompt a custodial parent to consider relocating after the divorce is 
final, including moving to be closer to family or other support per-
sons,2 remarrying,3 fleeing an abusive situation,4 seeking a higher-
paying job,5 or pursuing a new career.6 In virtually every case, a cus-
 
 ∗ This article was presented at the Symposium on the ALI Principles on the Law of 
Family Dissolution, held at Brigham Young University’s J. Reuben Clark Law School on Feb-
ruary 1, 2001. 
 ∗∗ Cecil C. Humphreys Professor of Law, University of Memphis. The author grate-
fully acknowledges the support provided for this project from the Cecil C. Humphreys Foun-
dation. The author also wishes to recognize the excellent research assistance of Ms. Elissa Mul-
rooney and the generosity of Dean Katherine Bartlett, reporter for PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF 
FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, who provided the author with an 
unpublished final draft of ALI section 2.17 on relocation. 
 1. See Anne L. Spitzer, Moving and Storage of Postdivorce Children: Relocation, the 
Constitution and the Courts, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 3 (observing that during the first four 
years following divorce or separation, seventy-five percent of custodial mothers moved at least 
once, and half of those mothers moved again). 
 2. See, e.g., McGuinness v. McGuinness, 970 P.2d 1074, 1075 (Nev. 1998) (dealing 
with a custodial mother who, after the death of her mother, sought to relocate from Nevada to 
West Virginia in order to be near her siblings and to live in her mother’s house rent-free while 
attending college). 
 3. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Shaddle, 740 N.E.2d 525 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (reversing 
the trial court’s denial of mother’s petition to relocate to Florida with new spouse and child 
from new marriage). 
 4. See, e.g., Marshall v. Marshall, 690 N.E.2d 68 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (reversing 
award of custody to father where mother moved with children because of husband’s admitted 
physical abuse). 
 5. See, e.g., Weaver v. Kelling, No. WD 58972, 2001 WL 55518 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 
23, 2001) (affirming trial court’s order allowing custodial mother to relocate children from 
Missouri to Texas so that her new husband could accept a job promotion with a substantial pay 
increase). 
 6. See, e.g., Phillips v. Jordan, 614 N.W.2d 183 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (affirming 
award allowing custodial mother to relocate to California based on mother’s remarriage and 
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todial parent’s relocation with the child will significantly disrupt the 
coparenting relationship that the parties have been following postdi-
vorce. Notice of that relocation decision is often viewed by the non-
custodial parent as a violation of the parties’ coparenting agreement 
and as a threat to the noncustodial parent’s relationship with the 
child. Objections to the relocation are often viewed by the custodial 
parent as attempts by the noncustodial parent to assert unwarranted 
control or to relitigate the custody decision. Tempers tend to flare in 
such circumstances, and the parties often resort to renewed litigation 
in the form of a petition to modify custody or a motion to prevent 
the relocation of the child. 
A relocation battle can be extremely traumatic for the child who 
is caught in the middle, particularly where the parties already en-
gaged in a protracted custody fight at the time of the divorce. Yet 
that is the very type of case in which relocation is likely to trigger a 
new battle between the parents, with each parent presenting compel-
ling arguments and claiming to be motivated by the child’s best in-
terests. Clearly, a protracted relocation dispute is not in the child’s 
best interests. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Current law governing relocation decisions varies dramatically 
from state to state,7 often focusing on parental rights, explicitly or 
implicitly favoring either the custodial or noncustodial parent,8 at the 
 
her desire to study the real estate business because a career in real estate would allow her to 
work part-time and to fit her schedule around the child’s schooling). 
 7. See Edwin J. (Ted) Terry et al., Relocation: Moving Forward or Moving Backward?, 
31 TEX. TECH L. REV. 983, 1040 (2000) (stating that jurisdictions fundamentally disagree 
“on the underlying premises that shape litigation in relocation disputes, and it is difficult to see 
how a model act can alter the fundamental disagreements,” while also noting that the current 
trend in court opinions favors relocation). 
 8. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.17, Reporter’s Notes cmt. d (unpublished Tentative Final Draft on 
file with author) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES (Tentative Final Draft)] (commenting that states 
place very different burdens on the parents in relocation cases, ranging from a heavy burden on 
the relocating parent to show benefits of the relocation to a strong presumption in favor of 
relocation); Janet M. Bowermaster, Sympathizing with Solomon: Choosing Between Parents 
in a Mobile Society, 31 J. FAM. L. 791, 803 (1992–93) (“[D]ecisions reflect the underlying 
decisional principle of protecting the child’s relationship with either the custodial or noncusto-
dial parent. The policy decision to accord priority to one relationship or the other is accom-
plished in part by allocating the burden of proof to the nonfavored parent.”). 
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expense of children’s rights.9 States that place the burden on the re-
locating parent10 focus on the child’s need for stability in the current 
custodial setting where the child is able to have frequent contact 
with both parents, especially when the non-relocating parent has 
been actively involved in parenting the child. States that place the 
burden on the non-relocating parent11 focus on the importance of 
stability in the relationship between the child and the primary custo-
dial parent, the fact that the relocating parent has previously been 
determined to be the parent best suited to be the primary custodial 
parent, and the relocating parent’s legitimate need to relocate. Each 
of these approaches presents a compelling argument both for and 
against relocating the child. 
In a perfect world, parents would always love each other and 
their children and would never divorce. In a less perfect world, fol-
lowing divorce, the parents would continue to put the children’s in-
terests first at all times, would coparent amicably, and would con-
tinue to live in close proximity and provide for frequent contact 
between the children and each parent. The world is not so perfect, 
 
 9. See Carol S. Bruch & Janet M. Bowermaster, The Relocation of Children and Cus-
todial Parents: Public Policy, Past and Present, 30 FAM. L.Q. 245 (1996) (summarizing the 
jurisprudence of various states on the relocation issue as of 1996); Spitzer, supra note 1, at 3 
(supporting relocation absent exceptional circumstances); Janet Leach Richards, Children’s 
Rights v. Parents’ Rights: A Proposed Solution to the Custodial Relocation Conundrum, 29 
N.M. L. REV. 245 (1999) (reviewing current jurisprudence of all states and arguing that relo-
cation issues should be based on children’s rights); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY 
DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.20, Reporter’s Notes cmt. d, at 366 
(Tentative Draft No. 3, Part I, Mar. 20, 1998) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 
3, Part I)] (recognizing that “[t]he clear trend has been that of increasing leniency toward the 
parent with whom the child has been primarily living”). 
 10. In such cases, the relocating parent usually must prove that the move is in the child’s 
best interests. See, e.g., Rice v. Rice, 517 S.E.2d 220, 222 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999) (recognizing 
a presumption against removing children from the state); Trent v. Trent, 890 P.2d 1309 (Nev. 
1995) (placing a burden on the relocating parent to show that moving is in child’s best inter-
ests). 
 11. See, e.g., In re Custody of D.M.G. & T.J.G., 951 P.2d 1377, 1383 (Mont. 1998) 
(explaining that because an order prohibiting a custodial parent from relocating interferes with 
the custodial parent’s fundamental right to travel, “‘we require the parent requesting the travel 
restriction to provide sufficient proof that a restriction is, in fact, in the best interests of the 
child.’”) (quoting In re Marriage of Cole, 729 P.2d 1276, 1281 (Mont. 1986)); In re Mar-
riage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473, 478 (Cal. 1996) (California statute creates a “presumptive 
right of a custodial parent to change the residence of the minor children, so long as the re-
moval would not be prejudicial to their rights or welfare”); Aaby v. Strange, 924 S.W.2d 623 
(Tenn. 1996) (recognizing a presumption in favor of relocation where primary custodial parent 
has a good faith reason for the move, absent a showing of harm by the non-relocating parent). 
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however, and the reality is that primary custodial parents have differ-
ing motives for relocating, including compelling, important, legiti-
mate, whimsical, and even vindictive motives. On the other hand, 
the non-relocating parent may have the same range of motivations in 
resisting the relocation. Focusing on parental rights and motivations 
leads to inconsistent outcomes and increased litigation. Even the 
scholars writing on the topic tend to take positions that favor12 or 
disfavor13 relocation. Courts have long recognized that relocation 
presents difficult issues for which there are not easy solutions.14 This 
observation is particularly true when the court sees the issue as being 
determined between the parties before the court, the parents. If, in-
stead, the issue is presented as a determination of what outcome best 
serves the interests of the child,15 the results become more predict-
able and consistent, resulting in less litigation. 
 
 12. See, e.g., Mitzi M. Naucler, Relocation of Parents in Modification of Parenting 
Plans in Oregon, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 585 (1999); Richards, supra note 9; Bruch & 
Bowermaster, supra note 9; Spitzer, supra note 1. 
 13. See, e.g., Merril Sobie, Whatever Happened to the “Best Interests” Analysis in New 
York Relocation Cases?: A Response, 15 PACE L. REV. 685 (1995); Frank G. Adams, Com-
ment, Child Custody and Parental Relocations: Loving Your Children from a Distance, 33 
DUQ. L. REV. 143 (1994); Paula M. Raines, Joint Custody and the Right to Travel: Legal and 
Psychological Implications, 24 J. FAM. L. 625, 656 (1986). 
 14. See Kalkowski v. Kalkowski, 607 N.W.2d 517, 527 (Neb. 2000) (“Parental reloca-
tion issues are among the most difficult issues that trial courts face in postdivorce proceed-
ings”) (citing Farnsworth v. Farnsworth, 597 N.W.2d 592, 601 (Neb. 1999)); In re Marriage 
of Pape, 989 P.2d 1120, 1126 (Wash. 1999) (“Relocation cases ‘present some of the knottiest 
and most disturbing problems that our courts are called upon to resolve’”) (quoting Tropea v. 
Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145, 148 (N.Y. 1996)); Newell v. Rammage, 7 S.W.3d 517, 525 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1999) (“This case involving the move of a parent presents a most difficult decision[;] 
neither parent is a villain or has shown any vindictive or untoward motive in dealing with the 
other parent.”). 
 15. Another court took a child-centered focus, stating, 
Relocation cases such as the two before us present some of the knottiest and most 
disturbing problems that our courts are called upon to resolve. In these cases, the 
interests of a custodial parent who wishes to move away are pitted against those of a 
noncustodial parent who has a powerful desire to maintain frequent and regular 
contact with the child. Moreover, the court must weigh the paramount interests of 
the child, which may or may not be in irreconcilable conflict with those of one or 
both of the parents. 
Tropea, 665 N.E.2d at 148; see also Michael A.A. v. Stephanie E.W., No. CN95-11285, 1999 
WL 33208309, at *2 (Del. Fam. Ct. Nov. 1, 1999) (“While the Court should consider the 
rights of the parents, the child’s rights and needs must be given the greatest weight since the 
children are the least equipped to handle the stresses of the changing family situation.”). 
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III. ALI RELOCATION PRINCIPLES—OVERVIEW 
A child-centered approach is the basis of section 2.2016 of the 
ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Rec-
ommendations (the “Principles”). The Principles address parental re-
location and offer guidelines for courts to follow in balancing the 
rights of the affected parties when one parent seeks to relocate with 
the child over the objection of the other parent.17 The Principles also 
offer guidelines for achieving what is often the least detrimental al-
ternative,18 consistent with the best interests of the child. Section 
2.20 will be renumbered as section 2.1719 in the final draft. This arti-
cle will review the proposed final draft of section 2.17. 
The title of the symposium for which this article was prepared 
asks whether the ALI Principles are a blueprint to strengthen or to 
deconstruct families. This article argues that the relocation provisions 
serve to strengthen the reconstituted family unit, consisting of the 
child and the parent who is exercising a clear majority20 of custodial 
 
 16. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, Part I), supra note 9, § 2.20. 
 17. The Reporter’s Notes to section 2.17 identify three jurisdictions—Connecticut, Ne-
vada and Tennessee—that have adopted relocation standards “substantially similar” to the 
Principles. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Final Draft), supra note 8, § 2.17 cmt. d. See Ireland v. Ire-
land, 717 A.2d 676 (Conn. 1998); Hayes v. Gallacher, 972 P.2d 1138 (Nev. 1999); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 36-6-108 (Supp. 2000), interpreted in Caudill v. Foley, 21 S.W.3d 203 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. 1999); see also Naucler, supra note 12, at 597–98 (arguing for adoption in Oregon 
of the Principles regarding relocation, on the ground that they are consistent with Oregon ap-
pellate court opinions). 
 18. Finding a good solution to relocation disputes can be difficult, if not impossible: 
[Relocation] decisions often require a balancing of risks rather than a straightfor-
ward best interests analysis. For example, it might be in the child’s best interests to 
deny a custodial mother the right to relocate with a child to maintain the child’s 
community connection and contact with the other parent. If as a result of that deci-
sion, a custodial parent is required to live separately from a new spouse or to pass up 
a significant career advancement, that parent could suffer significant anger, hostility, 
or depression, thereby compromising parenting skills and the parent-child relation-
ship. Thus, the decision that it is currently in the best interests of the child to have 
continued contact with both parents could have a profound impact on the restruc-
tured family dynamics. That impact could potentially have a detrimental effect on 
the child. 
Arline S. Rotman et al., Reconciling Parents’ and Children’s Interests in Relocation: In Whose 
Best Interest?, 38 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 341, 365 (2000). 
 19. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Final Draft), supra note 8. 
 20. The Principles use the phrase “parent who has been exercising the clear majority of 
custodial responsibility,” rather than the term “primary custodial parent.” The Principles like-
wise charge the state with determining what constitutes a “clear majority” through a rule of 
statewide application. Id. § 2.17(4)(a). The comment suggests that a simple majority would 
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responsibility (hereinafter “primary custodial parent”). The reloca-
tion provisions also serve to preserve and foster the relationship be-
tween the child and the parent who is exercising substantially less 
custodial responsibility than the other parent (hereinafter “nonpri-
mary custodial parent”). 
The Principles strengthen the reconstituted family by setting 
forth guidelines that are consistent with the best interests of the child 
in a relocation case. Social science research has addressed the ques-
tion of what is in the best interests of children of divorce. Social sci-
ence research21 suggests that the goals of any relocation principles 
should include: 
(1) Stability in the custodial relationship;22 
(2) Minimization of parental conflict involving the child;23 and 
 
not be sufficient, but that a percentage between sixty and seventy percent would be reasonable. 
See id. § 2.17 cmt. d; see also W. VA. CODE § 48-11-403 (1999) (adopting the Principles on 
relocation and setting seventy percent as the requisite amount of custodial responsibility re-
quired under this provision). 
 21. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD, 32–39 
(1996) (recognizing the child’s need for continuity in relocation decisions); Terry, supra note 
7, at 1012 (summarizing social science research as finding that a child is likely to make a satis-
factory adjustment to divorce if “(1) the noncustodial parent sees the child on a regular basis; 
(2) the custodial parent continues to be supported and exercises appropriate discipline; (3) the 
parents are able to cooperate without conflict; (4) the child’s standard of living changes little; 
and (5) the transition is accompanied by no other major disruptions in the child’s life.”); Ju-
dith S. Wallerstein & Tony J. Tanke, To Move or Not to Move: Psychological and Legal Con-
siderations in the Relocation of Children Following Divorce, 30 FAM. L.Q. 305, 311 (1996) 
(identifying three factors associated with good outcomes for children in postdivorce families: 
“(1) a close, sensitive relationship with a psychologically intact, conscientious custodial parent; 
(2) the diminution of conflict and reasonable cooperation between the parents; and (3) [the 
absence of] pre-existing psychological [problems of the child]”); FRANK F. FURSTENBERG & 
ANDREW J. CHERLIN, DIVIDED FAMILIES: WHAT HAPPENS TO CHILDREN WHEN PARENTS 
PART 108 (1991) (listing two principles for guiding social policy: (1) “The more effectively 
custodial parents can function, the better will be their children’s adjustment” and (2) “The less 
parental conflict children are exposed to, the better will be their adjustment.”). 
Some courts have already recognized the importance of social science research in resolv-
ing relocation disputes. See, e.g., Silbaugh v. Silbaugh, 543 N.W.2d 639, 642 (Minn. 1996) 
(“[O]ur concern must be for the Silbaugh children and their need for a sense of stability in 
their familial arrangements.”); Aaby v. Strange, 924 S.W.2d 623, 627 (Tenn. 1996) (relying 
on the “collective wisdom of both the courts and child psychologists [for the proposition that] 
children, especially those subjected to the trauma of divorce, need stability and continuity in 
relationships most of all”) (quoting Taylor v. Taylor, 849 S.W.2d 319, 328 (Tenn. 1993)). 
 22. In cases where one parent is the primary residential parent, the emphasis should be 
on protecting the relationship between the primary residential parent and the child. However, 
in cases where the parents share custodial responsibilities equally, it is important to protect the 
child’s relationship with both parents equally. See Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 21, at 318. 
 23. See James A. Twaite & Anya K. Luchow, Custodial Arrangements and Parental 
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(3) Promotion of stable, loving relationships between the child 
and each parent.24 
There is disagreement among researchers on the relative impor-
tance of custodial stability versus active involvement of both par-
ents.25 This fundamental difference of opinion concerning which fac-
tor is more important for the child is also reflected in the two 
differing approaches taken by the courts and legislatures that wrestle 
with the issue. One approach favors relocation while the other does 
not. 
The ALI relocation provisions attempt to balance all three of 
these goals by recognizing a presumption in favor of relocation in 
most cases, with a secondary goal of protecting and preserving the 
parent-child relationship of the parent who is exercising substantially 
less custodial responsibility than the other parent. This approach is 
supported by the research of Dr. Judith Wallerstein, who argues that 
support for the primary custodial parent-child relationship should 
take precedence over joint parental access because of the presence of 
a correlation between the well-being of the primary custodial parent 
and the child’s well-being and the absence of a correlation between 
nonprimary custodial parent visitation and the child’s well-being.26 
 
Conflict Following Divorce: The Impact on Children’s Adjustment, 24 J. PSYCHOL. & L. 53 
(1996) (stating that the level of parental conflict is a better predictor of child adjustment than 
the custodial arrangement); Janet R. Johnston et al., Ongoing Postdivorce Conflict: Effects on 
Children of Joint Custody and Frequent Access, 59 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 576 (1989) 
(finding severe consequences for children forced to endure frequent transfers between high 
conflict parents). 
 24. See Richard A. Warshak, Social Science and Children’s Best Interests in Relocation 
Cases: Burgess Revisited, 34 FAM. L.Q. 83, 84 (2000) (stating that a review of more than sev-
enty-five studies in the social science literature, including those authored and relied upon by 
Judith Wallerstein, “generally supports a policy of encouraging both parents to remain in close 
proximity to their children” and arguing for a best interests determination in each case). Ne-
braska statutory law recognizes the importance of both parents’ involvement: 
The Legislature finds it is in the best interests of a minor child to maintain, to the 
greatest extent possible, the ongoing involvement of both parents in the life of the 
minor child. . . . It is the policy of this state to assure the right of children, when it is 
in their best interests, to frequent and continuing contact with parents who have 
shown the ability to act in the best interests of the children and to encourage parents 
to share in the rights and responsibilities of raising their children after divorce or 
separation. 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-2902 (1998). 
 25. See Terry, supra note 7, at 1013–15. 
 26. See Wallerstein & Tanke, supra note 21, at 312, (citing JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & 
SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN, AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER 
DIVORCE 238 (1989), and FURSTENBERG & CHERLIN, supra note 21, at 107–08); see also 
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The Principles protect the child’s need for stability and continu-
ity of custodial care and decrease the likelihood, in most cases, of 
protracted litigation that would negatively affect the child. This re-
sult is accomplished by decreasing indeterminacy in relocation cases 
through the use of a presumption, thereby discouraging litigation in 
most cases.27 The guidelines on modifying the parenting plan also 
focus on protecting the interests of the other parent, thus addressing 
the third goal of meeting the child’s need to have a loving relation-
ship with both parents. The specific provisions of section 2.17 that 
combine to implement these goals are discussed below. 
IV. PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF RELOCATION 
Section 2.17 is designed to eliminate litigation in most cases in-
volving relocation. The section provides that the primary custodial 
parent28 should be allowed to relocate with the child as long as that 
parent proves three things: “that the relocation is for a valid purpose, 
pursued in good faith, and the new location is reasonable in light of 
the purpose.”29 There is no additional requirement that the relocat-
ing parent show that the move is beneficial to the child or that the 
move is in the child’s best interests,30 thus removing an area of judi-
cial discretion that invites litigation and leads to inconsistent out-
comes. This approach is child-centered, even though it recognizes a 
presumption in favor of relocation and precludes the court from en-
 
Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr. et al., Paternal Participation and Children’s Well-Being After Marital 
Dissolution, 52 AM. SOC. REV. 695 (1987) (stating that frequent visitation neither fostered 
nor hindered child’s adjustment); Steve Leben & Megan Moriarty, A Kansas Approach to Cus-
todial Parent Move-Away Cases, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 497, 542 (1998) (conceding that “no 
precise minimum level of visitation has been found to be either optimal or critical” but also 
criticizing the validity of some research methodology). 
 27. See Cheryl S. Karner, Relocation: What Ought to Be, 20 FAM. ADVOC. 12, 14 
(1997) (observing that the “more predictable (if not formulaic) the outcome, the less likely 
parties will be to take their chances in a trial or hearing”). 
 28. See supra note 20 for a definition of primary custodial parent. 
 29. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Final Draft), supra note 8, § 2.17 (4)(a); see Ireland v. Ire-
land, 717 A.2d 676, 682 (Conn. 1998); Hayes v. Gallacher, 972 P.2d 1138, 1140–42 (Nev. 
1999) (adopting this section). 
 30. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Final Draft), supra note 8, § 2.17 illus. 5 (stating that a 
father who exercised a clear majority of custodial responsibility and was transferred by his em-
ployer should be allowed to relocate, and stating further that the court should not determine 
whether the relocation is in the best interests of the children, but should only modify the par-
enting plan to allow the relocation and to minimize the impact of the relocation on the 
mother’s relationship with the children through longer summer and vacation visits). 
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gaging in a best interests analysis. The approach is child-centered be-
cause it is designed to reduce litigation in a large number of cases by 
reducing indeterminacy, thus minimizing parental conflict involving 
the child. The approach is also designed to preserve the primary cus-
todial parent-child relationship, thus promoting stability in the cus-
todial relationship. The focus of the court’s inquiry in these cases 
shifts from determining whether to allow the relocation to determin-
ing how best to preserve the relationship between the child and the 
non-relocating parent, again a child-centered approach. 
The relocating parent has the burden of proving31 the first re-
quirement, the validity32 of the reason for the move. The validity is 
presumed, however, if the reason is one of the following six desig-
nated in the section as valid reasons for relocating: 
(1) to be close to significant family or other sources of support; 
(2) to address significant health reasons; 
(3) to protect the safety of the child or another member of the 
child’s household from a significant risk of harm; 
(4) to pursue a significant employment or educational opportu-
nity;33 
(5) to be with one’s spouse or domestic partner who lives in or is 
pursuing a significant employment or educational opportunity in the 
new location; or 
(6) to improve significantly the family’s quality of life.34 
 
 31. See Ireland, 717 A.2d at 682 (interpreting the ALI guidelines to place the burden 
on the relocating parent). 
 32. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Final Draft), supra note 8, § 2.17 illus. 5 (finding that 
primary custodial father’s purpose in relocating was valid because his continued, reasonable 
employment depended upon it, where the father’s employer transferred all of its employees to 
another office, and where the father looked for other jobs that would not require a move, but 
was not able to find an offer for more than eighty-five percent of his current salary); id. § 2.17 
illus. 6 (finding that primary custodial father’s purpose in relocating was not valid where he 
quit his job and relocated to be able to surf in his spare time and where he took a lower paying 
job at the new location). 
 33. See id. § 2.17 illus. 9 (finding that primary custodial mother’s desire to relocate to 
the community where her family lived and where she could work in the family retail business 
was a valid purpose, where the mother was not able to find a job above minimum wage in her 
present location). 
 34. See id. § 2.17(4)(a)(ii); see also Ireland, 717 A.2d at 682 (endorsing these exam-
ples, but emphasizing that the list was not exclusive); Hayes, 972 P.2d at 1140–42 (adopting 
this section); Hauser v. Hauser, No. CVFA 970401065S, 1999 WL 712805, at *2 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Aug 27, 1999) (applying the list as adopted in Ireland, but finding that relocating 
to be with one’s fiancé was not the same as relocating to be with one’s spouse, and holding 
that the relocating parent failed to prove a valid purpose for the move). But see Trent v. Trent, 
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These reasons are sufficiently inclusive to remove the validity of 
the move as a contested issue in most relocation cases, again sparing 
the child from litigation. 
As to the second requirement, the non-relocating party has the 
burden35 of showing that the new location is reasonable in light of 
the valid purpose for the move. Section 2.17 presumes that the new 
location is reasonable, as long as the purpose is valid, unless the non-
relocating party can demonstrate36 that the purpose, though valid, 
can be substantially achieved either (1) without moving,37 or (2) by 
moving to a location that is substantially less disruptive of the non-
relocating parent-child relationship.38 
This provision is an important limitation on relocation that serves 
to protect the relationship between the child and the non-relocating 
parent. If the needs of the relocating parent can be met without 
 
890 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Nev. 1995) (reversing trial court’s denial of mother’s request to relo-
cate in order to marry her fiancé because of the short period of time the couple had known 
each other and the limited amount of time spent together since meeting). 
 35. See Ireland, 717 A.2d at 682 (interpreting the ALI guidelines to place the burden 
on the relocating parent). 
 36. The actual language of the section does not specifically place the burden on the par-
ent opposing the relocation. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Final Draft), supra note 8, § 
2.17(4)(a)(iii). It states that “[t]he court should find that a move for a valid purpose is reason-
able unless its purpose is shown to be substantially achievable without moving, or by moving 
to a location that is substantially less disruptive of the other parent’s relationship to the child.” 
Id. 
Illustration 10 states that where the Montana mother who wants to pursue training in a 
radiology technician program shows that she was denied admission to the only program in 
Montana and that she has been admitted to a program in Kansas, her reason is valid and her 
location is reasonable. “Unless [the father] demonstrates that [she] can achieve her purpose at 
a location that is less disruptive to his access to the children, the court should modify the 
parenting plan to accommodate the relocation.” Id. § 2.17 illus. 10. The mother should make 
a prima facie showing of reasonableness of the location in order to make out her case, then the 
burden shifts to the father to show the unreasonableness of the location. Id. 
Illustration 11 suggests that where the primary custodial parent wants to relocate from 
near New York City to Las Vegas to “make a new life” as a singer, she must “explain why she 
has chosen Las Vegas, as opposed to . . . New York City which is closer.” Id. § 2.17 illus. 11. 
Presumably, the mother in such a case would have to make a prima facie showing of the rea-
sonableness of her choice in establishing her right to relocate. The Reporter’s Notes to section 
2.17 indicate that illustration 11 is loosely based on Weiss v. Weiss, 418 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 
1981). See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Final Draft) supra note 8, § 2.17, Reporter’s Notes cmt. d. 
 37. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Final Draft), supra note 8, § 2.17 illus. 12 (finding that 
primary custodial parent’s desire to relocate is a valid purpose, but that the location is not rea-
sonable if it can be shown that the parent can meet her “reasonable educational objectives” by 
attending a law school that will not require a relocation). 
 38. See Hayes, 972 P.2d at 1140–42 (adopting this section). 
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moving or by moving to a location that is better for preserving the 
non-relocating parent-child relationship, the right to relocate will be 
limited accordingly. Again, the rights of the child are paramount.39 
Some critics may argue that this provision allows the non-relocating 
parent unjustified control over the other parent’s right to relocate. 
That view is supported by an approach that focuses on parental 
rights and argues that the primary custodial parent should have the 
same unfettered right to relocate that the nonprimary custodial par-
ent enjoys. When the issue is viewed from the child’s perspective, 
however, one may argue that this limitation on the custodial parent’s 
right to relocate protects the child’s right both to have stability in 
the primary custodial arrangement and also to have the best oppor-
tunity for an ongoing relationship with the other parent. Thus, the 
limitation on relocation is not a right granted to the non-relocating 
parent at the expense of the relocating parent; it is, instead, a right 
granted to the child to have both stability in the custodial relation-
ship and a stable loving relationship with both parents. Closer prox-
imity to the non-relocating parent is likely to promote a more stable 
and involved relationship. 
The allocation of the burden of proof as to the third require-
ment, that of good faith, is not clearly indicated in the provisions of 
section 2.17, but it seems reasonable that the non-relocating party 
would have the burden of coming forward with some evidence of 
lack of good faith after the relocating parent alleges a good faith mo-
tive in seeking to relocate. It is easier for the non-relocating parent 
to prove the presence of bad faith than for the relocating parent to 
prove the absence thereof. 
Section 2.17 does not define good faith other than in the con-
text of failure to comply with the section’s notice requirements. The 
 
 39. See Hauser, 1999 WL 712805, at *2 (adopting what is now PRINCIPLES (Tentative 
Final Draft) § 2.17, supra note 8, and finding that the proposed location was not reasonable in 
light of the proposed purpose of remarriage because the fiancé could just as easily move to 
Connecticut where the custodial mother lived). For a case adopting the ALI approach indi-
rectly, through the “reasonable purpose to relocate” requirement, see Schremp v. Schremp, 
No. W1999-01734-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 1839127 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 2000), which 
held that a mother did not have a reasonable purpose to relocate to North Carolina to live with 
her new husband, a Federal Express pilot based in Memphis, where Mother’s new husband had 
no compelling reason to refuse to move to Memphis to live with Mother; see also PRINCIPLES 
(Tentative Final Draft), supra note 8, § 2.17 illus. 7 (finding that a relocation 400 miles away 
due to an employment transfer was not reasonable when the parent had the option to relocate 
only fifty miles away, but chose the more distant location in order to avoid having to arrange 
weekly visits between the children and their mother). 
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section provides that a relocating parent is required to give prior no-
tice40 of the intent to relocate and that failure, without good cause,41 
to comply with the notice requirements may be considered as a fac-
tor in determining whether the relocation is in good faith.42 The no-
tice requirement applies to all relocating parents, whether or not 
they intend to move with the child.43 The advance notice gives the 
parties an opportunity to try to reach a voluntary agreement on a 
modified parenting plan that will accommodate the relocation. If an 
agreement is reached, the parties should submit the agreement to the 
court for approval so that the modifications will be judicially enforce-
able.44 
Unfortunately, many parents are not able voluntarily to reach 
agreement regarding relocation. Under the Principles, if the parties 
are not able to reach a voluntary agreement, the relocating parent 
must seek permission from the court to relocate with the child. 
When the parties are trying to reach a voluntary agreement, the de-
gree of indeterminacy in the applicable criteria can affect the out-
come. Indeterminacy discourages settlement and increases the likeli-
 
 40. Section 2.17(2) contains the following notice requirements: 
(2) Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a parent who has responsibility under a 
parenting plan who changes, or intends to change, residences for more than ninety 
days should be required to give a minimum of sixty days advance notice, or the ear-
liest notice practicable under the circumstances, to any other parent with responsi-
bility under the same parenting plan. Notice should include 
(a) the relocation date, 
(b) the address of the intended new residence, 
(c) the specific reasons for the proposed relocation, and 
(d) a proposal for how custodial responsibility should be modified, in light of the in-
tended move. 
PRINCIPLES (Tentative Final Draft), supra note 8, § 2.17(2). 
Domestic violence may excuse the relocating parent from providing an address in the re-
location notice. See id. § 2.17 cmt. c. 
 41. The comments suggest that flight from domestic violence is an example of good 
cause. Id. § 2.17 cmt. c. A noncomplying parent should, however, seek permission of the court 
before failing to comply with the notice provisions, if possible, or as soon thereafter as rea-
sonably possible. Id. 
 42. See id. Unexcused failure to give notice can also form the basis for an award of ex-
penses and reasonable attorney’s fees. See id. 
 43. See id. § 2.17(2) & cmt. c. The justification given in the comment for imposing 
notice requirements on the relocating parent who is not seeking to move with the child is that, 
“among other reasons, the custodial parent may wish to seek an upward modification of the 
relocating parent’s child support obligation, reflecting that parent’s reduced level of custodial 
responsibility or additional costs involved in long-distance visits.” Id. § 2.17 cmt. c. 
 44. See id. § 2.17 cmt. c. 
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hood of litigation. 
States that currently allow the trial court to condition relocation 
upon proof that the move is in the best interests of the child increase 
indeterminacy and encourage litigation, thereby exposing more chil-
dren to the trauma of a contested relocation battle. Additionally, ex-
penses involved in pursuing such litigation could reduce funds avail-
able for the child. 
By establishing criteria that remove indeterminacy in most relo-
cation cases, section 2.17 reduces the risk of litigation for most chil-
dren whose primary custodial parent chooses to relocate postdivorce. 
Indeterminacy is reduced in those cases involving a primary custodial 
parent who satisfies the three criteria previously discussed. In such 
cases, the court is not permitted to deny the move simply by con-
cluding that not relocating would be best for the child. 
A 1993 Tennessee case, Taylor v. Taylor,45 is illustrative of the 
open-ended best interests approach. In Taylor, the mother was 
awarded primary custody of the parties’ three-year-old daughter. The 
mother remarried and sought to relocate with her child to Iowa in 
order to join her new spouse, who was enrolled in chiropractic 
school. She also found a job in Iowa earning the same salary as the 
job she currently held in Tennessee. All extended family members of 
both parents still lived in Tennessee and exercised frequent visitation. 
The father exercised regular visitation and had a close, loving rela-
tionship with the child. There were no members of the extended 
family living in Iowa. Based on these facts, the trial court found that 
it would not be in the best interests of the minor child for those 
regular contacts with other family members to be severed and denied 
the relocation petition.46 The court of appeals affirmed. 
The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the trial court, adopting 
a rule very similar to the Principles,47 and allowed the primary custo-
 
 45. 849 S.W.2d 319 (Tenn. 1993). 
 46. The trial court found: 
 There are no members of the extended family living in Davenport, Iowa, and the 
only advantage to the minor child of such a move would be that she would be in a 
complete family. The disadvantage of allowing the move would be that the father 
and all other members of the minor child’s extended family would be denied ordi-
nary visitation. 
Id. at 321 (emphasis added). 
 47. The Taylor court held that the custodial parent would have the burden of proving 
that relocation was in the child’s best interests, but further held that the burden could be 
“shifted by a prima facie showing of a sincere, good-faith reason for the move and a prima facie 
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dial parent, who was then living in an apartment in Tennessee with 
her daughter and another child, born of her new marriage, to relo-
cate with her daughter. The court also ordered that a reasonable visi-
tation schedule be established to maintain the father-daughter rela-
tionship. 
Not all courts adopt the approach of the Tennessee Supreme 
Court, which favors relocation. The Supreme Court of Alabama, in 
Ex parte Monroe, was recently faced with arguments similar to those 
presented in Taylor. The trial court denied the relocation, finding 
that it was in the child’s best interests to stay with the non-relocating 
parent and near very supportive extended family members.48 The 
court of appeals reversed the trial court’s order transferring custody 
to the father, contingent on the relocation of the custodial mother.49 
The supreme court, however, reinstated the trial court’s order. The 
Monroe court did not articulate a specific relocation rule. Instead, it 
applied the general rule for seeking a modification of custody, that 
the party seeking the modification must show (1) that the positive 
good brought about by the modification will more than offset the 
inherently disruptive effect caused by uprooting the child, (2) that 
the parent seeking the modification is fit, and (3) that the change of 
custody will materially promote the child’s best interests and wel-
fare.50 The trial court was persuaded by the father’s expert who testi-
fied about the importance of the child’s relationship with his father 
and found that it was in the child’s best interests to stay in Alabama, 
close to his father and extended family members.51 The supreme 
 
showing that the move is consistent with the child’s best interest.” Id. at 332. The Taylor rule, 
recognizing a presumption in favor of relocation in most cases, subject to limited exceptions 
designed to protect the child from harm, is similar to the ALI approach. The ALI approach 
differs from Taylor, however, in that the ALI gives greater discretion to the court and is a more 
comprehensive treatment of the relocation issue in that it addresses issues not addresses in Tay-
lor, such as joint custody and relocation requests by the nonprimary custodial parent. 
 48. See Ex parte Monroe, 727 So. 2d 104 (Ala. 1999) (considering a mother who 
sought relocation after her job was eliminated and she was offered a transfer to another posi-
tion in Michigan, where her fiancé lived). 
 49. See id. at 104–05. 
 50. See id. at 105. 
 51. See id. at 105–06. The father’s expert testified 
that fathers were “very important for sons in particular” and that by being with his 
father a boy “learns how to be a male, an adult male.” Dr. Rinn also testified that 
boys who have close relationships with their fathers tend to have higher academic 
achievement, tend to be more empathetic as adults, and tend to be more compas-
sionate toward others. Dr. Rinn concluded his testimony by stating that the more 
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court reinstated the trial court’s order based on the absence of proof 
that the trial judge’s determination was clearly erroneous or against 
the great weight of the evidence.52 A strong dissent pointed out that 
neither the trial court nor the supreme court considered the detri-
mental impact on the child of disrupting the existing custodial rela-
tionship between the mother and the child.53 The mother’s expert 
testified that such a change would be “very difficult and at least pos-
sibly traumatic.”54 The ALI approach, in contrast to the Monroe ma-
jority, places great weight on the importance of stability in the exist-
ing custodial arrangement where one parent is the primary custodial 
parent. 
The Principles would allow relocation under the facts of Taylor 
and Monroe, although the relocation might be limited to the dura-
tion of the degree program in Taylor.55 The court would not, how-
ever, be permitted under the Principles to undertake a broad, discre-
tionary, best interests determination like the one made by the trial 
judge in Taylor. Upon finding that the primary custodial parent has 
established good faith, a valid purpose, and a reasonable location, the 
only issue for the parties and the court, under section 2.17, would be 
the modification of the parenting plan so as to preserve the nonpri-
mary custodial parent-child relationship.56 The goal of the parenting 
 
time a male child is able to spend with his father, the more well rounded and better 
adjusted that child would be. 
Id. at 106. The mother’s expert testified that the child was enthusiastic about the move, that 
the child’s relationship with the mother was very close, and that the child was emotionally de-
pendent on the mother. Id. 
 52. See id. at 106. 
 53. See id. at 107 (Lyons & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting). 
 54. Id. at 108. 
 55. Illustration 8 to comment d in section 2.17 suggests that the court might limit the 
relocation in Taylor to the duration of the degree program. In illustration 8, the primary cus-
todial parent marries an attorney, earning $900,000, who is confirmed by the senate to be the 
U.S. Attorney General, at a salary below $150,000. Wife seeks to relocate the child to Wash-
ington. The comment states that the “parenting plan should be modified to accommodate the 
relocation, at least for the period in which Jonah is Attorney General.” PRINCIPLES (Tentative 
Final Draft), supra note 8, § 2.17 illus. 8; see also id. § 2.17 illus. 10 (suggesting that the 
modification “may be temporary, effective only while Darlene is enrolled in the program that 
justifies her relocation.”). The Reporter’s Notes to section 2.17 indicate that illustration 10 is 
based on In re Marriage of Elser, 895 P.2d 619 (Mont. 1995), overruled on other grounds by 
Porter v. Galarneau, 911 P.2d 1143 (Mont. 1996). PRINCIPLES (Tentative Final Draft), supra 
note 8, § 2.17, Reporter’s Notes cmt. d. 
 56. The Principles provide, 
Under § 2.17(4)(a), if a parent has been exercising a clear majority of custodial re-
sponsibility and the move is in good faith, no further analysis is required. The court 
10RIC.DOC 1/3/02  3:56 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2001 
1120 
plan modification is to preserve, to the extent possible, the same 
proportion of custodial responsibility and to minimize, to the extent 
possible, the disruptive effect of the relocation on the non-relocating 
parent-child relationship.57 The ALI approach will, hopefully, ensure 
that most such cases are settled between the parties and do not de-
volve into protracted, contested battles that have negative conse-
quences for the child involved. 
A presumption in favor of the primary custodial parent58 who 
seeks to relocate is supported by social science research that demon-
strates the importance of continuity of care and stability in the cus-
todial relationship.59 If the child’s best interests were served, at the 
time of divorce, by awarding primary custodial care to the relocating 
parent, it is reasonable to assume that the child’s best interests would 
continue to be served, in most instances, by maintaining that custo-
dial relationship. Further litigation would be redundant. This ap-
proach is also consistent with the priority given to “past patterns of 
caretaking” throughout the ALI custody provisions.60 
V. BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD STANDARD 
If the primary custodial parent does not qualify for the presump-
tion in favor of relocation by establishing good faith and a valid pur-
pose for the move to a location that is reasonable in light of that 
purpose, the court must decide the case based on the best interests 
of the child.61 In such a case, there is no basis for a presumption in 
 
is not permitted to prevent a relocation simply because it determines that such a re-
location would not, on balance, be best for the child. 
PRINCIPLES (Tentative Final Draft), supra note 8, § 2.17 cmt. d. 
 57. Under the Principles, “the court should revise the parenting plan, if practical, to 
accommodate the relocation and maintain the allocation of responsibilities being exercised by 
each parent.” PRINCIPLES (Tentative Final Draft), supra note 8, § 2.17(3). The Principles fur-
ther state,  “The court should minimize the impairment to a parent-child relationship caused 
by a parent’s relocation through alternative arrangements for the exercise of custodial respon-
sibility appropriate to the parents’ resources and circumstances and the developmental level of 
the child.” PRINCIPLES (Tentative Final Draft), supra note 8, § 2.17(4)(e). 
 58. For a definition of primary custodial parent, see supra note 20. 
 59. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 60. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Final Draft), supra note 8, § 2.17 cmt. d. 
 61. Under the Principles, 
If a parent who has been exercising the clear majority of custodial responsibility does 
not establish that the purpose for that parent’s relocation is valid and to a location 
that is reasonable in light of the purpose, the court should order the plan modifica-
tions most consistent with the child’s best interests. Among the modifications the 
10RIC.DOC 1/3/02  3:56 PM 
1105] Resolving Relocation Issues 
 1121 
favor of relocation, and the court should have discretion to make a 
best interests determination, consistent with the Principles regarding 
the same. 
VI. CONTINGENT REALLOCATION OF CUSTODIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
One of the options suggested in the Principles allows the court 
to reallocate primary custodial responsibility contingent upon actual 
relocation of the primary custodial parent.62 A contingent order al-
lows the primary custodial parent the option of not relocating in or-
der to maintain the status quo. From the perspective of the child’s 
best interests, the status quo, presumably, would still be preferable to 
a change in custody to the other parent. The hope in such cases is 
that the primary custodial parent will elect not to relocate and that 
the parties will maintain the status quo regarding parental responsi-
bilities set out in the parenting plan at the time of the divorce. 
The Principles make clear, however, that the child’s best interests 
are paramount.63 The court should, therefore, still allow the child to 
relocate, even when the relocating parent fails to show good faith 
and a valid purpose for the move to a location that is reasonable in 
light of that purpose, if the court finds that relocation is consistent 
with the best interests of the child.64 
This approach allows the relocation question to be separated 
from the modification of the parenting plan. The court first decides 
whether to allow the relocation. If relocation is denied, the parent 
requesting the relocation can choose not to relocate and simply re-
 
court should consider is a reallocation of primary custodial responsibility, effective if 
and when the relocation occurs, but such a reallocation should not be ordered if the 
relocating parent demonstrates that the child’s best interests would be served by the 
child’s relocation with the parent. 
PRINCIPLES (Tentative Final Draft), supra note 8, § 2.17(4)(b). 
 62. See id. The comments state that the court should not use a conditional transfer of 
primary custodial responsibility to persuade the moving parent not to relocate if the other par-
ent is not able or fit to assume that responsibility or where such allocation of parental responsi-
bility is not consistent with the child’s best interests. See id. § 2.17 cmt. d. 
 63. See id. § 2.17(4)(b). 
 64. See id.; see also id. § 2.17 cmt. d illus. 7 (permitting parent with questionable mo-
tives to relocate where relocation, despite parent’s questionable motives, is in the child’s best 
interests); Kerkvliet v. Kerkvliet, 480 N.W.2d 823, 829 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (denying motion 
to change custody on the basis that “although [custodial parent’s] reasons for her proposed 
move are feeble and insensitive, the fact remains that she is an excellent primary caregiver to 
the children”). 
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turn to the status quo. If the parent decides, instead, to relocate over 
the objection of the court, the solution is not to transfer primary cus-
todial responsibilities automatically to the other parent,65 but to de-
termine the child’s best interests. The court may make the change in 
custody contingent on relocation if custody with the non-relocating 
parent would be in the child’s best interests,66 but the court must al-
low the child to relocate where relocation is in the best interests of 
the child, even if the criteria giving rise to a presumption in favor of 
relocation are not met. 
Such a situation might arise when a relocating parent seeks to re-
locate to be with a new spouse and children from the new marriage, 
but the relocating parent fails to give notice of the relocation to the 
other parent in bad faith and in an attempt to thwart the relationship 
between the child and the non-relocating parent. The court in such a 
case may find that the relocating parent has not established a claim 
for the presumption in favor of relocation and will be called upon to 
order a parenting plan modification most consistent with the child’s 
best interests. The court may find that relocation is, nevertheless, in 
the child’s best interests, based on the need for stability in the custo-
dial arrangement, the need to be with other step-siblings, and the 
child’s wishes.67 This approach treats the child’s interests as para-
mount, unlike courts that automatically transfer custody to the other 
parent without finding that such a change is in the child’s best inter-
 
 65. See Hayes v. Gallacher, 972 P.2d 1138, 1140–42 (Nev. 1999) (adopting the Prin-
ciples and reversing trial court’s order transferring custody to the father, conditioned on the 
mother’s relocation to Japan, without first making a determination that custody with the father 
would be in the children’s best interests, especially in light of a substantiated history of domes-
tic violence). 
 66. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Final Draft), supra note 8, § 2.17 illus. 11. This illustra-
tion considers a primary custodial mother who sought to relocate from New York to Las Vegas 
to “make a new life” as a singer, although she had no concrete plans for doing so and no ex-
planation why her goals could not be achieved nearby in New York City. Id. The illustration 
suggests that “[u]nless she carries the burden on these matters, or demonstrates that her con-
tinued primary custodial responsibility is in [the child’s] best interests even if her move is not 
reasonable, the court should conditionally order that [the father] have primary custodial re-
sponsibility of [the child].” Id.; see also Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1983) (revers-
ing order denying permission to relocate without an evidentiary hearing where denial of peti-
tion was likely to result in a change of custody). 
 67. These are all factors that the court may consider in making a best interests determi-
nation under the best interests test in PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.09 (Tentative Draft No. 4, April 10, 2000) [hereinaf-
ter PRINCIPLES (Tentive Draft No. 4)]. 
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ests, but simply upon finding that the relocation should be denied,68 
or courts that condition custody on not relocating where a change in 
custody would not be in the child’s best interests.69 
VII. RELOCATION BY NONPRIMARY CUSTODIAL PARENT 
If the request to relocate with the child is made by a nonprimary 
custodial parent, the relocating parent must show that the relocation 
is necessary to prevent harm to the child.70 This approach is consis-
tent with social science research favoring continuity of custodial care 
as well as the general focus in the Principles supporting pre-divorce 
allocations of parental responsibility.71 A relocating parent who has 
been exercising substantially less custodial responsibility for the child 
than the other parent should not be permitted to relocate with the 
child and disrupt the existing relationship between the child and the 
primary custodial parent, at least absent a showing of potential harm 
to the child. Such a claim might be established where the child lives 
primarily with the non-relocating parent, but has such a deep emo-
tional attachment to the relocating parent that relocation is necessary 
to prevent harm to the child.72 
A nonprimary custodial parent who is not able to make a suffi-
cient showing of harm to relocate with the child may still request the 
 
 68. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Sullivan, 594 N.Y.S.2d 276, 278 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (re-
versing trial court’s order that denied mother’s petition to relocate and transferred custody to 
the father without determining that such a change was in the children’s best interests, where 
father would be at work “four out of five days” and would not get home until 11:15 p.m. and 
where mother was employed part-time and had flexible hours that allowed her to be more in-
volved in child care). 
 69. See, e.g., id. (reversing trial court’s transfer of custody to father, finding that it was 
in children’s best interests to remain in mother’s custody, but conditioning mother’s continu-
ing custody on her return to her pre-petition location). 
 70. The Principles explain, 
The court should deny the request of a parent for a reallocation of custodial respon-
sibility to enable the parent to relocate with the child if the parent has been exercis-
ing substantially less custodial responsibility for the child than the other parent, 
unless the relocating parent demonstrates that the reallocation is necessary to pre-
vent harm to the child. 
PRINCIPLES (Tentative Final Draft), supra note 8, § 2.17(4)(d). 
 71. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 67, § 2.09(3) (referring to “this 
section’s priority on the share of past caretaking functions each parent performed”). 
 72. See id. § 2.09(1)(d) (recognizing an exception to the presumptive allocation of cus-
todial responsibility based on pre-separation caretaking where necessary “to protect the child’s 
welfare when the presumptive allocation under this section would harm the child because of a 
gross disparity in the quality of the emotional attachment between each parent and the child”). 
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court to modify the parenting plan in order to minimize the disrup-
tive effect of the relocation on the nonprimary custodial parent-child 
relationship.73 This relief should be requested only where the parties 
are not able to reach a voluntary agreement to modify the parenting 
plan to accommodate the relocation. 
VIII. JOINT PHYSICAL CUSTODY STANDARD 
In cases involving shared parenting or joint physical custody, 
there is no primary custodial parent and, consequently, no basis in 
social science research to give preference to the relocating parent. In 
such cases, the Principles state that the court should be guided by 
the best interests of the child, taking into account the effects of the 
relocation on the child.74 As always, the parties should be encour-
aged to work out a modification of the parenting plan and submit it 
to the court for approval. Voluntary agreements in such cases may be 
harder to achieve because of the absence of a presumption in favor of 
either parent and because of the deep involvement and commitment 
of each parent in the child’s life.75 However, the fact that the parents 
 
 73. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Final Draft), supra note 8, § 2.17 cmt. f illus. 14 (finding 
that a father with alternate weekend custodial responsibility who is transferred by his employer 
would not be allowed to relocate with his son absent a showing of harm to the child by re-
maining in the mother’s care, even though the father’s new wife would be able to keep the 
child at home instead of using day care, as the mother currently did, while she worked full-
time; however, the father would be able to obtain a modification of the parenting plan to ac-
commodate alternative visiting arrangements with the child); see also id. § 2.17 cmt. g illus. 17 
(allowing a father who intends to move from New York to California and whose four-year-old 
daughter spends two nights per week with him, to modify the parenting plan to provide for 
two week-long visits in California, provided that two separate week-long visits are “practical in 
light of the resources of the parents and the age of the child”). 
 74. The Principles provide, 
If neither parent has been exercising a clear majority of custodial responsibility for 
the child, the court should order the plan modifications most consistent with the 
child’s best interests, taking into account all relevant factors including the effects of 
the relocation on the child. 
PRINCIPLES (Tentative Final Draft), supra note 8, § 2.17(4)(c); see also McGuinness v. 
McGuinness, 970 P.2d 1074, 1080 n.1 (Nev. 1998) (Springer, C.J., dissenting) (citing 
PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, Part I), supra note 9, § 2.20 (4)(b) in support of the ap-
plication of a best interests test in cases involving joint physical custody); PRINCIPLES (Tenta-
tive Final Draft) § 2.17 illus. 17 (stating that the court should apply a best interests test when 
both parents are actually sharing custodial responsibilities equally and the relocation of one of 
them makes the continuation of such allocation impracticable). 
 75. See, e.g., Hoover v. Hoover, 764 A.2d 1192 (Vt. 2000) (affirming award of sole 
custody to father when mother sought to relocate and parties, who shared custodial 
responsibilities nearly equally, were not able to reach an agreement among themselves). 
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have shared custodial responsibilities on a nearly equal basis suggests 
a higher level of cooperation76 than exists in the many cases where 
one parent is the primary custodial parent. This particular provision 
is not very controversial, as a number of states apply a best interests 
test when the parties have nearly equal parenting responsibilities, 
sometimes referred to as shared or joint physical custody.77 
IX. PRESERVATION OF THE NON-RELOCATING 
PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP 
The ALI relocation provisions recognize the importance of pre-
serving and protecting the relationship between the child and the 
non-relocating parent. Section 2.17(3) provides that the court 
should, where practical, modify the parenting plan both to accom-
modate the relocation and to maintain the allocation of responsibili-
ties being exercised by each parent.78 Modifications should, where 
possible, “maintain the child’s existing relationship with each parent, 
without unnecessarily changing the basic shares of a parent’s respon-
sibility.”79 Oftentimes, it is possible to allocate roughly the same 
proportion of custodial time after the relocation by allowing longer 
summer and holiday visits if the child is school-aged.80 
Such maintenance of relative parental responsibilities will not be 
possible in all cases involving relocation, however. As to those cases, 
section 2.17(4)(e) charges the court to minimize the potential harm 
to the non-relocating parent-child relationship through alternative 
 
 76. Almost all joint physical custodial arrangements are the result of an agreement of the 
parties. Historically, courts have been very reluctant to order parties to share physical custody 
on a equal basis, but have approved such arrangements when they were proposed by agreement 
of the parties. 
 77. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996); Brisbois v. Brisbois, 
767 So. 2d 887 (La. Ct. App. 2000); Braun v. Headley, 750 A.2d 624 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
2000); Brown v. Brown, 621 N.W.2d 70 (Neb. 2000); Murphy v. Jaramillo, 795 P.2d 1028 
(N.M. Ct. App. 1990); Myer-Liedtke v. Liedtke, 762 A.2d 1111 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000). 
 78. According to the Principles, “When changed circumstances are shown under Para-
graph (1), the court should revise the parenting plan, if practical, to accommodate the reloca-
tion and maintain the allocation of responsibilities being exercised by each parent.” 
PRINCIPLES (Tentative Final Draft), supra note 8, § 2.17(3). 
 79. Id.  § 2.17 cmt. d. 
 80. The non-relocating parent may still object that such an arrangement is detrimental 
to the parent-child relationship because of the loss of frequent, regular involvement in the 
child’s life. The relocating parent may object to such an arrangement as giving all the “fun” 
time to the non-relocating parent and leaving the relocating parent only with the “school” 
time. 
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arrangements81 for parental responsibility, taking into account the 
parties’ resources and circumstances as well as the developmental 
needs of the child.82 The Principles do not specify the manner in 
which the court is to take into account the parties’ resources in pro-
viding alternative arrangement for parental responsibility. Tennessee 
currently allows the court to consider the increased travel expenses 
associated with relocation as a basis for reducing the child support 
obligation.83 A Nevada district court, in Trent v. Trent,84 allocated 
the burden of travel expenses to the relocating parent, finding that it 
was appropriate to do so in light of the relative economic circum-
stances of the parties. Making the payment of travel funds an obliga-
tion between the parties rather than offsetting those costs against 
child support is more protective of the child’s interests and insures 
the availability of support necessary for the child. 
 
 81. Where the non-relocating parent is not available for long summer visits because of 
his work schedule, illustration 16 suggests the following alternatives: 
The court may require [the mother] to investigate year-round school alternatives 
that would free the children up for longer visits during the fall and winter months 
when [the father] is more available. Another possibility would be for [the father] to 
spend some extended periods in Kansas during the time when he is not working so 
that he can spend more time with the children. The plan could also contain meas-
ures to further communication between [the father] and his children when they are 
apart for extended periods, such as telephone calls, letters, and tapes. 
PRINCIPLES (Tentative Final Draft), supra note 8, § 2.17 illus. 16. 
 82. The Principles direct, “The court should minimize the impairment to a parent-child 
relationship caused by a parent’s relocation through alternative arrangements for the exercise of 
custodial responsibility appropriate to the parents’ resources and circumstances and the devel-
opmental level of the child.” PRINCIPLES (Tentative Final Draft), supra note 8, § 2.17(4)(e); 
see also Hayes v. Gallacher, 972 P.2d 1138, 1140–42 (Nev. 1999) (adopting this section). 
Also, the Principles state that where the parents earn more that $500,000 annually, the parent-
ing plan should be modified to enable the non-relocating parent to maintain his relationship 
with his children to the greatest extent possible. Since the children are old enough to fly and 
financial resources are ample, frequent weekend visits, prolonged vacation periods, and specific 
measures designed to further communication during the week should be specified, such as 
telephone, the Internet, and even the U.S. mail. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Final Draft), supra 
note 8, § 2.17 illus. 15. 
 83. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Final Draft), supra note 8, § 2.17 illus. 15 (“The court 
shall assess the costs of transporting the child for visitation and determine whether a deviation 
from the child support guidelines should be considered in light of all factors including, but not 
limited to, additional costs incurred for transporting the child for visitation.”). 
 84. 890 P.2d 1309, 1313 (Nev. 1995) (allowing relocation with the relocating mother 
paying the transportation costs and accompanying the child for visits, where the mother would 
be able to bear the costs, but the father would not). 
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X. STANDARD FOR REVIEW OF RELOCATION REQUESTS 
Not every relocation is a basis for court intervention under the 
ALI relocation guidelines. A relocation is a substantial change in cir-
cumstances, justifying court oversight, only when the relocation sig-
nificantly impairs the status quo regarding the exercise of parental re-
sponsibilities.85 Thus, the parent who has not been exercising those 
parental responsibilities awarded in the parenting plan prior to 
receiving notice of the proposed relocation cannot object to the 
relocation on the ground that it will impair that parent’s ability to 
exercise awarded parental responsibilities after the relocation.86 A 
parent must seize upon and exercise parental responsibilities in order 
to claim protection under this section when those rights are 
threatened by relocation.87 
The only exception to this threshold test is the situation in which 
the attempt by one parent to exercise parental responsibilities has 
been thwarted.88 The Principles afford protection to the parent who 
has tried, without success, to exercise parental responsibilities allo-
cated in the parenting plan, prior to receiving notice of the proposed 
relocation.89 Acquiescence on the part of the thwarted parent, how-
 
 85. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Final Draft), supra note 8, § 2.17(1) (“The relocation of 
a parent constitutes a substantial change in circumstances . . . only when the relocation signifi-
cantly impairs either parent’s ability to exercise responsibilities that parent has been exercising 
or attempting to exercise.”); see also Hayes, 972 P.2d at 1140–42 (adopting this section). 
 86. See Karen Czapanskiy, Interdependencies, Families, and Children, 39 SANTA CLARA 
L. REV. 957, 1031 n.161 (1999) (citing the ALI relocation provisions and arguing that where 
the non-relocating parent has failed to assume parental responsibilities, relocation by the pri-
mary custodial parent should not satisfy the “change in circumstance” standard which entitles 
the non-relocating parent to challenge the move). 
 87. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Final Draft), supra note 8, § 2.17 illus. 1 (finding that a 
mother’s planned relocation does not constitute a substantial change of circumstances where 
the father has, of his own volition, seen the child only eight times during the past year, despite 
a parenting plan which allocates parental responsibility to the father from Thursday after school 
through Sunday after dinner each week). 
 88. See id. § 2.17(1); see also id. § 2.17 illus. 4 (stating that one parent’s abduction of 
the child, in violation of the parenting plan which allocated custodial responsibilities equally 
between the parents, was a substantial change of circumstances and the court’s allocation of 
custodial responsibilities should be decided based on the best interests of the child, pursuant to 
section 2.17(4)(c)). 
 89. See id. § 2.17 illus. 3 (stating that whether the mother’s planned relocation 
amounted to a significant change of circumstances would be determined by the time allocated 
to the father in the parties’ parenting plan, rather than the lesser, actual time spent with the 
child due to the mother’s interference, where the father challenged the mother’s attempt to 
restrict his access to the child as provided for in the parenting plan, first by complaining to the 
mother and later by petitioning the court). 
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ever, will lead to forfeiture of this protection.90 
One might argue that a rule that conditions the right to chal-
lenge a relocation on whether the non-relocating parent has actually 
been exercising parental rights is actually an attempt to protect the 
primary custodial parent’s rights rather than the child’s interests, 
given the social science research recognizing the importance of main-
taining an ongoing, loving relationship with both parents. Actually, 
the rule both prevents manipulative behavior by a parent who is not 
interested in being involved in the child’s life, but who is interested 
in controlling and thwarting the other parent, and protects the inno-
cent parent whose noninvolvement is the result of manipulative be-
havior on the part of the relocating parent. The rule also protects the 
child’s right to access to the non-relocating parent, to the extent that 
the parent is willing to be involved in the child’s life. Under this rule, 
the previously uninvolved parent is not allowed to challenge the re-
location, but would be allowed to seek a modification of the parent-
ing plan to obtain an allocation of parenting responsibilities after the 
relocation. Thus, the door is always open for the uninvolved parent 
to become involved in the child’s life, to the extent that such in-
volvement is consistent with the child’s best interests. 
XI. JUDICIAL DISCRETION 
One of the chief complaints about a presumptive rule in favor of 
relocation, like that contained in the Principles regarding primary 
custodial parents, is that it takes discretion away from the trial judge. 
One response to this complaint is that broad discretion results in 
greater indeterminacy, which leads to increased litigation and con-
flict. The presumption in favor of relocation produces determinacy 
and reduces litigation and conflict. There are instances, however, 
when the presumption, however well-intentioned and helpful in 
most cases, may fail to protect the child’s best interests in a particular 
case. The task is to identify those limited situations in which the 
court should be allowed to exercise discretion in order to protect the 
 
 90. See id. § 2.17 cmt. b (“a parent who acquiesces in the new arrangements cannot 
later rely on parental prerogatives the parent did not value highly enough to protect”); id. § 
2.17 illus. 2 (suggesting that whether the mother’s planned relocation amounted to a signifi-
cant change of circumstances would be determined by the actual time the father spent with the 
child rather than the time allocated to him in the parenting agreement, where the father acqui-
esced in the mother’s scheduling the child’s activities at times that conflicted with the father’s 
available time). 
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child. 
Section 2.17 provides that the court, in addition to following the 
principles reviewed above, may also consider the best interests of the 
child as defined in the Principles.91 The ALI best interests definition 
presumes that the pre-separation allocation of custodial responsibility 
is consistent with the child’s best interests, but allows the court to 
consider, when appropriate to do so, certain limiting factors, includ-
ing the wishes of the child, the emotional attachment of the child to 
each parent, any agreement between the parties, the availability of a 
parent to meet the child’s needs, the practicality of the allocation of 
parental responsibility, the need to keep siblings together, and the 
need to protect the child from substantial and almost certain harm.92 
These limiting factors afford the court some discretion in determin-
ing whether a modification is appropriate. 
For instance, a primary custodial parent who seeks to relocate in 
good faith, for a valid purpose, and to a reasonable location may 
nevertheless be prevented from doing so if the parties have entered 
into an agreement that addresses the issue of relocation.93 This non-
removal provision is one of the more controversial provisions in the 
relocation principles. A number of courts in the past have refused to 
enforce such agreements94 or have limited their enforceability.95 
Some states, however, enforce such agreements.96 Section 2.17 takes 
 
 91. See id. § 2.17(4) (“best interests as defined in § 2.08 and § 2.09,” which were pre-
viously numbered as § 2.09 and § 2.10, respectively, and are found in PRINCIPLES (Tentative 
Draft No. 4), supra note 67, § 2.09 and PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, Part I), supra 
note 9, § 2.10). 
 92. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Final Draft), supra note 8, § 2.17(4). 
 93. See id. § 2.17 illus. 18 (upholding and enforcing agreement that provided that the 
parents would share roughly equal parental responsibility and that the mother would have pri-
mary custodial responsibility unless she relocated, in which case the parenting plan would be 
modified to give primary custodial responsibility to the father, where mother could not show 
“unanticipated, substantial change in circumstances” or “severe and almost certain harm to the 
children” to justify avoiding the agreement). The Reporter’s Notes to section 2.17 indicate 
that some of the facts from illustration 18 are drawn from Bell v. Bell, 572 So. 2d 841 (Miss. 
1990). See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Final Draft), supra note 8, § 2.17, Reporter’s Notes cmt. h. 
 94. See, e.g., Bell, 572 So. 2d at 841 (refusing to enforce relocation restriction requir-
ing child to spend entire minority in same community); In re Marriage of Littlefield, 940 P.2d 
1362, 1372 (Wash. 1997) (holding that relocation restrictions in parties’ agreements are not 
enforceable). 
 95. See, e.g., Hovater v. Hovater, 577 So. 2d 461, 463 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990) (holding 
that a “reversionary” custody clause, which provides that custody will automatically revert to 
the other parent if the primary custodial parent relocates, is unenforceable). 
 96. Arizona law, for instance, provides, 
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the position that the agreements should be enforceable, subject to a 
number of policing policies. The comments to section 2.17 suggest 
that a provision in the parenting plan conditioning relocation upon 
agreement by the other parent would be binding unless the relocat-
ing parent could demonstrate unanticipated changed circumstances 
or severe and almost certain harm to the child.97 The agreement itself 
can be challenged if it was not knowingly or voluntarily entered into, 
or if it would be harmful to the child.98 A court hearing on these is-
sues is mandated where child abuse or domestic abuse has occurred, 
but a hearing is discretionary in other instances.99 A potential danger 
is that nonprimary custodial parents will routinely insist upon such 
nonremoval provisions in the parenting plan, thus injecting more in-
determinacy into the relocation question and increasing the potential 
risk of trauma for the child. 
The comments to section 2.17 also suggest the value of enforce-
able agreements in facilitating compromises between parents that 
serve the child’s interests. The example is given of a relocating parent 
being willing to allow a child to remain temporarily with the other 
parent following relocation if the relocating parent is secure in the 
knowledge that the agreement will be enforceable so that the situa-
tion will remain temporary.100 This approach might encourage a re-
locating parent to allow a child to finish the school year with the 
 
The court shall not deviate from a provision of any parenting plan or other written 
agreement by which the parents specifically have agreed to allow or prohibit reloca-
tion of the child unless the court finds that the provision is no longer in the child’s 
best interests. There is a rebuttable presumption that a provision from any parenting 
plan or other written agreement is in the child’s best interests. 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-408(I) (West 2000); see also Tomasko v. Dubuc, 761 A.2d 407 
(N.H. 2000) (enforcing non-relocation clause upon finding that move was not in children’s 
best interests); Lenz v. Lenz, 40 S.W.3d 111 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (enforcing non-relocation 
agreement despite mother’s request to relocate in order to remarry and return to Germany, 
where the two parties, German citizens, were married). 
 97. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Final Draft), supra note 8, § 2.17 cmt. h, illus. 19 
(allowing a primary custodial parent to relocate despite a parenting plan provision requiring 
consent of the other parent where the relocating parent could show unanticipated changed 
circumstances justifying the relocation and modification of the parenting plan based on her 
inability to find appropriate work due to health concerns). The Reporter’s Notes to section 
2.17 indicate that illustration 19 is based, in part, on Williams v. Pitney, 567 N.E.2d 894, 898 
(Mass. 1991). See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Final Draft), supra note 8, § 2.17, Reporter’s Notes 
cmt. h. 
 98. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 67, § 2.07(1). 
 99. See id. § 2.07(2). 
 100. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Final Draft), supra note 8, § 2.17 cmt. h. 
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non-relocating parent, rather than forcing the child to relocate in the 
middle of the school year. 
Presumably, the other limitations under the ALI best interests 
definition would also serve as limitations on the primary custodial 
parent’s right to relocate and as grounds for the exercise of judicial 
discretion. For instance, a primary custodial parent who seeks to re-
locate in good faith, for a valid purpose, and to a reasonable location 
may be prevented from doing so in order to accommodate the firm 
and reasonable preferences of an older child.101 A high school stu-
dent might successfully oppose relocating with the primary custodial 
parent under this provision if the court found the child’s preference 
to be reasonable under the circumstances. This section does not give 
children veto power over their parents’ relocation decisions; it simply 
allows the child’s voice to be heard and to be considered by the 
court where the court finds it appropriate to do so. 
The court also has discretion to deny the relocation of a primary 
custodial parent who otherwise meets the presumptive test for relo-
cation if the court finds that relocation would harm the child because 
of a gross disparity in the quality of the emotional attachments be-
tween each parent and the child.102 One parent may be designated 
the nonprimary custodial parent under the Principles because of the 
Principles’ presumption in favor of the pre-separation allocation of 
parenting responsibilities.103 The nonprimary custodial parent may, 
nevertheless, be the primary psychological parent for the child such 
 
 101. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 67, § 2.09(1)(b). The Princi-
ples direct that the state should adopt a uniform rule of statewide application regarding the age 
at which a child’s preferences may be considered. See also Judith S. Wallerstein & Julia Lewis, 
The Long-Term Impact of Divorce On Children: A First Report from a 25-Year Study, 36 
FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 368, 376–77 (1998). This article summarizes the findings 
of a twenty-five-year longitudinal study of children of divorce. Id. The researchers found nega-
tive consequences resulting from the failure to consider the older child’s wishes and concerns 
regarding visitation, sometimes resulting in total destruction of the noncustodial parent-child 
relationship that the visitation was intended to foster. Id. In fact, they reported that “[n]o sin-
gle child who saw his or her father under a rigidly enforced court order or unmodified parental 
agreement had a good relationship with him after reaching adulthood.” Id. 
 102. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 67, § 2.09(1)(d). 
 103. The Principles provide, 
Unless otherwise resolved by agreement of the parents . . . the court should be re-
quired to allocate custodial responsibility so that the proportion of custodial time 
the child spends with each parent approximates the proportion of time each parent 
spent performing caretaking functions for the child prior to the parents’ separa-
tion . . . . 
PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 67, § 2.09(1). 
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that relocation under certain conditions could result in severe emo-
tional harm to the child. In such cases, the court would have discre-
tion to protect the child’s best interests, even where the relocating 
parent sought to relocate in good faith, for a valid purpose, and to a 
reasonable location. 
Additional judicial discretion is granted where a child would be 
harmed because of a gross disparity between “each parent’s demon-
strated ability or availability to meet the child’s needs.”104 It is not 
clear whether this section could be read broadly enough to address 
the situation where the parent’s inability appears likely but has not 
been actually “demonstrated.” A primary custodial parent who is bi-
polar may be functioning adequately when living with her parents, 
who act as a support system by helping with the child care and by 
making sure that the parent sees her therapist regularly and takes her 
medication. A court might be justifiably reluctant to allow the parent 
to relocate to a place where there is no support system in place to en-
sure continued ability on the part of the parent to meet her parental 
obligations. 
A final concern that appears not to be addressed by the Principles 
is a relocation to a country that might not recognize the rights of the 
nonprimary custodial parent. If a primary custodial father seeks to re-
locate to a country that does not recognize the custodial rights of 
the nonprimary custodial mother, the court would be justified in de-
nying the relocation without some assurance that the mother’s cus-
todial rights could be protected. Although there is no provision di-
rectly addressing this issue, the Principles do contain an additional 
discretionary best interests factor, “to avoid substantial and almost 
certain harm105 to the child,”106 which should provide the court the 
discretion necessary to protect the child. 
XII. CONCLUSION 
The Principles do an excellent job of balancing the rights of both 
 
 104. Id. § 2.09(1)(d). Section 2.09(1)(h) contains an additional discretionary best inter-
ests factor, “to avoid substantial and almost certain harm to the child,” which might also be 
relied upon by the court in this instance. Id. § 2.09(1)(h). 
 105. See William G. Austin, Relocation Law and the Threshold of Harm: Integrating 
Legal and Behavioral Perspectives, 34 FAM. L.Q. 63, 64 (2000) (presenting a forensic psycho-
logical model of relocation risk assessment for use by the court in assessing potential harm to 
the child caused by the relocation). 
 106. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 4), supra note 67, § 2.09(1)(h). 
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parents and the child and of ensuring that the child’s rights are 
paramount. Relocation is a problem for which there are no easy solu-
tions, but the Principles provide guidelines that will serve the child’s 
interests by decreasing litigation, increasing stability in the custodial 
relationship, preserving and fostering the child’s relationship with 
each parent, and providing limited judicial discretion when necessary 
to protect the child. Children will be well served by the adoption of 
the Principles on relocation. The West Virginia legislature has already 
adopted the relocation provision with only minor amendments,107 
and other states have judicially adopted significant portions of it.108 
Hopefully, courts and legislatures in the other states will give careful 
consideration to the Principles on relocation and decide to adopt 
them as well.109 
 
 107. See W. VA. CODE § 48-11-403 (1999). 
 108. Connecticut and Nevada each adopted a portion of the ALI relocation provisions as 
set forth in PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, Part I), supra note 9, § 2.20. See Ireland v. 
Ireland, 717 A.2d 676 (Conn. 1998); Hayes v. Gallacher, 972 P.2d 1138, 1140–42 (Nev. 
1999); see also supra note 17 (listing other states with relocation provisions similar to the ALI 
guidelines). 
 109. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Final Draft), supra note 8, § 2.17 incorporates by reference 
certain portions of two other sections, § 2.09 and § 2.10, of PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 
3, Part I), supra note 9. It is still possible to adopt the relocation provision without adopting 
the entirety of the Principles. The relevant portions of the other two sections could simply be 
incorporated into a relocation statute or court opinion based on the language in section 2.17. 
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